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This article examines the current status of federal and state law
regarding job preservation for the period of pregnancy-related disa-
bility. It also examines the issues of partial wage replacement and
parental leave for child-rearing purposes. The thesis is that despite
the federal laws prohibiting pregnancy discrimination, the rights of
pregnant workers remain far from uniform or extensive. After ana-
lyzing state maternity and parental leave laws, recent United States
Supreme Court pronouncements concerning such legislation, and
state unemployment compensation provisions, the authors recom-
mend a new national priority for parental leave with some wage
replacement.
In 1978 Congress amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19641 adding the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)2 in order to
overturn the Supreme Court's holding in General Electric Co. v. Gil-
bert.3 In Gilbert, an employee challenged a medical fringe benefit
plan that did not provide coverage for pregnancy-related disabilities.
The Court upheld the insurance disability plan stating that it was
facially neutral even though it was not all-inclusive.4
The Supreme Court in Gilbert relied upon its prior decision in
Geduldig v. Aiello6 in which a state employee's insurance disability
plan excluding pregnancy coverage failed an equal protection chal-
lenge. The Geduldig Court found that since pregnant women are not
* Associate Professor of Law, Bentley College. B.A., Boston College; J.D., Boston Col-
lege Law School.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Bentley College. B.A., M.A., Boston College; J.D., Suf-
folk University Law School; LL.M., Boston University School of Law.
1. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982)).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1982)).
3. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
4. Id. at 137.
5. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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members of a suspect class, the plan only had to bear a rational
relationship to its purposes. It also found the plan consistent with the
"one step at a time" approach.6 Justice Stewart, writing for the ma-
jority, concluded that the classification merely distinguished between
"pregnant women" and "nonpregnant persons" on the theory that
"the first group is exclusively female, the second includes members
of both sexes.""
The Pregnancy Discrimination Act redefined sex discrimination
under Title VII to include discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions."' 8 The amendment also
mandated that "women affected by pregnancy . . . shall be treated
the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so af-
fected but similar in their ability or inability to work . . . ."' This
interpretation of the PDA has led to a debate whether equal treat-
ment of women and men in the workplace prohibits special treat-
ment for pregnant and postpartum women.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of special treatment of
pregnant women under the PDA in California Federal Savings &
Loan Association v. Guerra.1" In Guerra, the issue before the Court
was whether Title VII preempted a California law that required ma-
ternity leave and reinstatement rights for pregnant employees. The
Court found that Title VII did not preempt the California statute
because the statute was not inconsistent with the intent of Congress
in enacting the PDA and it did not require employers to violate Title
VII." Quoting the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,12 Justice
Marshall agreed that "Congress intended the PDA to be a floor be-
neath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop - not a
ceiling above which they may not rise.""3 Justice Stevens, concur-
ring, upheld the California statute, citing United Steelworkers v.
Weber. 4 Weber allowed preferential treatment under Title VII pro-
vided such treatment is designed to accomplish equality of employ-
6. Id. at 495; see also Wald, Judicial Construction of the 1978 Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Amendment to Title VII: Ignoring Congressional Intent, 31 AM. U.L. REV. 591, 594
(1982).
7. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 n.20 (1974).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1982).
9. Id.
10. 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
11. Id. at 695.
12. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396 (9th Cir. 1985).
13. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 691-92 (1987).
14. Id. at 695-96 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)). See infra
notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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ment opportunities and to remedy past discriminatory practices.1 5
According to Guerra, the PDA neither mandates nor prohibits pref-
erential treatment for pregnant employees."6
Reaction to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the PDA in
Guerra falls into two categories, the equal treatment model and the
special treatment approach. The "parity approach" or "equal treat-
ment" model advocates that there should be no distinction made be-
tween the sexes.' 7 Equal treatment supporters urge that the PDA
mandates only that pregnancy be treated as any other temporary dis-
ability. 8 According to the "special treatment" or "sex differences"
approach, however, the genders should be treated equally except in
areas of biological differences that should be recognized and treated
in a compensatory manner to assure equal employment opportu-
nity. 9 The sex differences approach agrees with the majority in
Guerra that the PDA allows for special treatment of pregnant work-
ers in order to give women equality in the work place."
Proponents of the equal treatment view criticize the sex differ-
ences model and the holding in Guerra for opening the door to sex-
based stereotypes that they contend are the basis of the paternalistic
laws of the past.2 These critics are willing to sacrifice the present
benefit of special treatment in exchange for nonrecognition of sex
differences that might invite or reinforce gender roles or sex stereo-
types.2 Guerra specifically mandated that the allowance for special
treatment be limited to cover only actual disability and that it not be
based upon stereotypes or generalizations about pregnant women's
needs or abilities.2 In this regard the Court noted, "A statute based
on stereotypical assumptions would, of course, be inconsistent with
Title VII's goal of equal employment opportunity." '24
15. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
16. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 692-93.
17. See Dowd, Maternity Leave: Taking Sex Differences Into Account, 54 FORDHAM L.
REV. 699, 716 (1986); Note, Sexual Equality Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 690, 704 (1983) (This note refers to the parity approach as the assimilationist
view) [hereinafter Note, Sexual Equality].
18. See Rodensky, California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra: Preferen-
tial Treatment and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 225, 232
(1987).
19. See Dowd, supra note 17, at 718; Rodensky, supra note 18, at 232; Note, Sexual
Equality, supra note 17, at 707 (Referring to the sex differences approach as the pluralist
view).
20. See Rodensky, supra note 18, at 248.
21. See Rodensky, supra note 18, at 228 n.16; Dowd, supra note 17, at 717.
22. See Rodensky, supra note 18, at 228 n.16; Dowd, supra note 17, at 717.
23. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 691 n.17, 694 (1987).
24. Id. at 694.
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Unlike the equal treatment approach, the sex differences ap-
proach recognizes that pregnancy cannot be analogized to other tem-
porary disabilities suffered by men and women. Childbearing has a
disparate impact on working women.2 a Women who take time off to
give birth face loss of wages, loss of seniority and even loss of their
jobs, while men may parent children without any effect on their job
status. 6 Because the labor market is tailored to the male model,
women can compete equally only if pregnancy is given special
protection. 7
In the United States, women comprise forty-two percent of the
total work force. 8 Thirty-three million of these working women are
of child bearing age and seventy-five percent of them can expect to
become pregnant during their careers.29 Pregnancy necessitates tak-
ing some period of time for childbirth. Allowing maternity policies to
develop on a state by state basis has left a void in this area of the
law. a" The United States has one of the worst policies regarding
pregnancy and childbirth of any of the industrialized nations."a
Facially neutral policies for the disabled in many instances have
not allowed women to preserve their jobs during the process of giving
birth. In Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission
of Missouri,32 a woman, ready to return to work twenty-five days
after giving birth, lost her job under her employer's facially neutral
policy because no position was available when she was ready to re-
turn to work. The facts in Wimberly do not reveal whether the em-
ployer maintained a recall list from which Wimberly might be called
back to work, and the Court's opinion makes no reference to any
right to recall as a prerequisite to compliance with section 701(k) of
Title VII.
The Court has deemed the right to recall important in other
contexts, such as the treatment of economic strikers under the Na-
25. See Rodensky, supra note 18, at 233.
26. Id.
27. See Casenote, Expanding the Boundaries of Equality: Taking Pregnancy Into Ac-
count in California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra, 28 B.C.L. REv. 783, 810
(1987) [hereinafter Casenote].
28. Id. at 783.
29. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, PREGNANCY AND EMPLOYMENT: THE COMPLETE
HANDBOOK ON DISCRIMINATION, MATERNITY LEAVE AND HEALTH AND SAFETY 3 (1987)
[hereinafter BNA].
30. See infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
31. S. KAMERMAN, A. KAHN AND P. KINGSTON, MATERNITY POLICIES AND WORKING
WOMEN 145 (1983) [hereinafter MATERNITY POLICIES].
32. 107 S. Ct. 821 (1987); see also infra note 49 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the issue of denial of unemployment compensation to women who leave their jobs because of
pregnancy.
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tional Labor Relations Act. 33 In NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co. the
Court stated:
This basic right to jobs cannot depend upon job availability as
of the moment when the applications are filed. The right to re-
instatement does not depend upon technicalities relating to ap-
plication .. . .If and when a job for which the striker is quali-
fied becomes available, he is entitled to an offer of
reinstatement. The right can be defeated only if the employer
can show "legitimate and substantial business justification." '34
There is no reason a woman returning to work from childbirth
should be treated with less deference than economic strikers. Rather,
the public policy expressed by the PDA indicates that such women
should, at a minimum, be entitled to nondiscriminatory consideration
for openings for which they are qualified."
II. Pregnancy Discrimination and the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act
The rights and benefits of pregnant women have stirred a de-
bate regarding section 3304(a)(12) of the Federal Unemployment
Tax Act (FUTA). s6 The three primary elements of the debate in-
clude: (1) varying interpretations of a broadly worded statute whose
plain meaning is in dispute; (2) differing perceptions of the legisla-
tive history and congressional intent behind the statute; and (3) con-
tradictory views of courts and commentators regarding how the stat-
ute should be applied.
Congress enacted FUTA in response to widespread unemploy-
ment during the Depression. Under the statute, unemployment
compensation is provided through the cooperation and interlocking
rules of the state and federal government. States must meet certain
minimum federal requirements to qualify for funds as part of the
scheme, but the states are allowed to set their own standards within
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
34. 389 U.S. 375, 381 (1967) (quoting NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 34
(1967)) (emphasis added).
35. See SCHLEI AND GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 399 (2d ed. 1983)
"Some courts, without articulating whether they were proceeding on an adverse impact ration-
ale, have held that an employer that does not rehire a woman who has been on a pregnancy
leave must establish a business necessity for its action." Id.
36. 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982).
37. Title IX of the Social Security Act of 1935, Ch. 9, §§ 301-303, 49 Stat. 620 (1935);
Note, Wimberly v. Labor and Industrial Relations Commission of Missouri: The Plain Im-
port of "Solely on the Basis of Pregnancy" and Unemployment Compensation, 14 W. ST. U.L.
REV. 587, 587-88 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Plain Import].
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the broad parameters of the federal guidelines." The Secretary of
Labor must review and approve the guidelines of each state to en-
.sure that they comply with federal standards. 9
Congress adopted the Unemployment Compensation Amend-
ments of 1976,40 adding requirements to FUTA that states must
meet. One amendment provides that "no person shall be denied [un-
employment] compensation under such State law solely on the basis
of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy.""1 Courts have taken va-
rying views of how the plain language of the statute applies and have
divined different meanings based on the statute's murky legislative
history. Those differences are best illustrated by Brown v. Porcher"2
and the Wimberly case."'
In Porcher, a federal district court in South Carolina broadly
interpreted the 1976 amendments to FUTA and ruled for the plain-
tiffs in a class action suit against the South Carolina Employment
Security Commission. The Commission would not give unemploy-
ment compensation to women who left their jobs because of
pregnancies and who could not find work upon re-entry in the job
market. The court focused on the word "denied" in Section
3304(a)(12) of FUTA, stating that under the statute's plain lan-
guage, no state action should deny women unemployment benefits as
a result of pregnancy." The court viewed the language of the statute
as well as its "historical context" as a "sweeping ban on withholding
unemployment compensation from women job seekers because they
were pregnant when they left their most recent work.""5
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit agreed with the
district court that the literal meaning of the statute is a clear ban on
denial of benefits on the basis of pregnancy generally."' The appel-
late court stated that "[r]egardless of how the Commission treats
employees with other disabilities, the mandate of the statute is clear:
the Commission cannot deny compensation 'solely on the basis of
38. See I.R.C. §§ 3302, 3304 (1982); Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n,
107 S. Ct. 821, 824 (1987).
39. See I.R.C. § 3304(a), (c) (1982).
40. Pub. L. No. 94-566, 90 Stat. 2667 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311
(1982)).
41. I.R.C. § 3304(a)(12) (1982).
42. 502 F. Supp. 946 (D.S.C. 1980), modified and remanded, 660 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1150 (1983).
43. 107 S. Ct. 821 (1987).
44. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. at 955. "In plain, unambiguous language, Congress imposed a
sweeping ban on the use of pregnancy or its termination as an excuse for denying benefits to
otherwise eligible women." Id. (emphasis in original).
45. Id. at 953.
46. Brown v. Porcher, 660 F.2d 1001, 1004 (4th Cir. 1981).
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pregnancy or termination of pregnancy.' 1147
The plaintiff in Wimberly, a sales clerk for J.C. Penney Co., left
her job of three years when she was seven months pregnant. About a
month after the birth of her baby, she sought to return to her job.
The company informed her no positions were available. 8 She filed
for unemployment compensation but her claim was denied based on
a Missouri statute that refused unemployment compensation to those
who left their jobs "voluntarily without good cause attributable to
[their] work or [their] employer."' 9
Justice O'Connor, writing for a unanimous Court, did not focus
on the "denied" language of Section 3304(a)(12) of FUTA as the
District Court had in Porcher. The Supreme Court rejected the
Porcher court's analysis and found that the word "solely" made the
meaning of the statute evident.50 According to the Court, the word
"solely" meant merely that state requirements had to be neutral.5"
Justice O'Connor interpreted the language of the statute as prohibit-
ing overtly discriminatory treatment rather than "mandating prefer-
ential treatment." 52 In effect, states do not have to provide special
treatment for pregnant or formerly pregnant women under section
3304(a)(12).5 1
These cases, Porcher and Wimberly, represent different inter-
pretations of the congressional intent and legislative history of
FUTA. Petitioner's brief in Wimberly claimed that the historical
context in which the amendments were passed, and changes in an
original draft of the amendments required that a pregnant woman or
new mother who "can work and is looking for work . . . is eligible
47. Id.
48. Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 821, 823 (1987).
49. Id. See also Mo. REV. STAT. § 288.-050.1(1) (1951). Quitting a job because of preg-
nancy was considered voluntary.
50. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 825.
51. Id. In this regard, the Court stated, "[I]f a State adopts a neutral rule that inciden-
tally disqualifies pregnant or formerly pregnant claimants as part of a larger group, the neutral
application of that rule cannot readily be characterized as a decision made 'solely on the basis
of pregnancy.'" The Court further added:
To apply this law, it is not necessary to know that petitioner left because of
pregnancy: all that is relevant is that she stopped work for a reason bearing no
causal connection to her work or her employer. Because the state's decision
could have been made without ever knowing that petitioner had been pregnant,
pregnancy was not the "sole basis" for the decision under a natural reading of §
3304(a)(12)'s language.
Id.
52. Id. at 828.
53. See Note, Plain Import, supra note 37, at 597.
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for unemployment benefits and should be paid. '54 The history of un-
employment compensation shows that Congress and the courts in-
tended the system to provide short-term benefits to the temporarily
unemployed, to stabilize the marketplace in times of economic de-
cline, and to address changes in the workforce to insure that "other-
wise employable individuals did not fall out of the mainstream of
American economic life."55 Congress viewed section 3304(a)(12) of
FUTA as a logical extension of this rationale by insuring that preg-
nant women be similarly protected.5"
Congressional examination of the role of women in the work-
place was initiated in part by Turner v. Utah Department of Em-
ployment Security.5 7 There, the Court struck down as a violation of
due process state action that assumed women to be unable to work at
a certain point in pregnancy. In contrast, the outcome in the Porcher
decision suggested that section 3304(a)(12) went beyond the mere
due process protection provided in Turner and imposed broad safe-
guards for pregnant women in the area of unemployment
compensation.
The petitioner in Wimberly argued that the original draft of
section 3304(a)(12) prohibited states from denying unemployment
compensation based on pregnancy. Petitioner's brief stated that "de-
terminations under any provision of such State law relating to volun-
tary termination of employment, availability for work, active search
for work, or refusal to accept work . . . shall not be made in a man-
ner which discriminates on the basis of pregnancy."5 8 Since Congress
removed the "discriminatory" language before passage of the sec-
tion, Petitioner Wimberly claimed that the deletion showed congres-
sional intent to transform the statute from a mere antidiscrimination
statute to one that stands as a "broad, comprehensive mandate to
eradicate all pregnancy-related disqualifications in the nation's un-
employment insurance system." 5
The Wimberly decision did not address the Porcher court's his-
torical analysis of the evolution of the unemployment compensation
system. The Court in Wimberly rejected the petitioner's interpreta-
tion of the statute and held that section 3304(a)(12), rather than
54. Petitioner's Brief at 25, Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 107 S.
Ct. 821, 826 (1987) (No. 85-129).
55, Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. 946, 954 (D.S.C. 1980).
56. Id. at 955.
57. 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
58. Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 821, 826 (1987).
59. Petitioner's Brief at 10, Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 107 S. Ct.
821 (1987) (No. 85-129).
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expanding the due process protection afforded in Turner, merely
codified it in accord with the intent of the House and Senate Re-
ports. 0 As for the change in language from the draft to final pas-
sage, according to the Court, the elimination of the discrimination
language did not affect the meaning of the statute, but rather re-
flected congressional economy in its use of language.61
While commentators have differed from the Court's analysis of
section 3304(a)(12),62 even those critical of the Court's analysis have
acknowledged that there is not a definitive single view of whether
Congress meant to prohibit facially neutral state statutes. One com-
mentator notes, "There is no hint of Congressional condemnation of
such facially neutral provisions, but there is also no hint of Congres-
sional approval of the treatment accorded pregnant women under
such provisions." 3 The Wimberly decision, however, is far from un-
assailable because of its public policy implications. The Court's in-
terpretation of "voluntary" as it relates to pregnant women and the
disparate impact such facially neutral qualifications have on women
violates section 3304(a)(12) because it creates "the potential for in-
tentional or effective gender discrimination." '64 The Court's interpre-
tation of the provision sanctions state statutes that do in fact deny
benefits to pregnant women. But for their pregnancies, these women
would not be classified as voluntary quits and, despite their inclusion
in a larger group of those disqualified from receiving benefits, they
are suffering a disparate impact based on gender.
A. Policy Rationale for Providing Unemployment Benefits for Eli-
gible Women Actively Seeking Work
Society gains by providing unemployment compensation benefits
for eligible women who are willing to work but who are forced to
leave their jobs because of pregnancy. Unemployment compensation
60. Wimberly, 107 S. Ct. at 827.
61. Id. at 826. In this regard the Court stated, "Indeed, however the first phrase is
interpreted--either to ban discrimination or to mandate preference-the additional anti-dis-
crimination language would have been superfluous. We conclude that Congress intended sim-
ply to eliminate a lengthy and redundant phrase, without intending to change the meaning of
the provision."
62. See generally Note, Plain Import, supra note 37; see also Note, Denial of Unem-
ployment Benefits to Otherwise Eligible Women on the Basis of Pregnancy: Section
3304(a)(12) of the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1925 (1984) thereinaf-
ter Denial].
63. Bellace, Maternity Rights: The Limits of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, in SE-
LECTED PAPERS OF THE AMERICAN BUSINESS LAW ASSOCIATION NATIONAL PROCEEDINGS 798,
801 (1987).
64. See Denial, supra note 62, at 1956.
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offers a "partial wage replacement to the involuntarily unemployed
worker so he or she can look for a job."6 5 Pregnancy invariably
forces a woman out of the labor force for at least a short time. Al-
though some employers provide protection for their pregnant em-
ployees and allow them to return to work, that protection is by no
means universal." The woman who is not guaranteed a return to her
old job must engage in a job search and her family can "suffer real
economic hardship," if the woman worker has no unemployment
compensation. 7
Without partial wage replacement, the woman may not be able
to afford necessary child care services so that she can conduct her
job search. A potentially useful worker suffers the financial and psy-
chological trauma that is associated with unemployment. In addition
to the loss of human capital, government loses financially through
reduced tax revenues and a potential drain on the social service sys-
tem. All of these dangers are exacerbated in society today because of
the increasing numbers of unwed mothers and single parent house-
holds. It makes sense both in human and financial terms to provide
unemployment compensation benefits in this instance.
B. Neutral Statutes Have a Disparate Impact on Women
To prevail in an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must prove
that a law that seemingly discriminates in its effect against a suspect
class has discriminatory intent.68 The intent requirement persists
when alleged constitutional violations based on gender are evalu-
ated.69 This standard, however, is substantially relaxed in light of
statutory directives that mandate equal treatment in the workplace.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,70 the Court barred the mere effect of
discrimination in light of the directives of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. The Act "proscribes not only overt discrimina-




In Title IX of the Social Security Act, the Pregnancy Discrimi-
65. Id. at 1954.
66. Brown v. Porcher, 502 F. Supp. 946, 955 (D.S.C. 1980); see also Dowd, supra note
17, at 710.
67. 502 F. Supp at 955. The overwhelming number of women granted maternity leave
forego all earnings during part or all of that leave. See MATERNITY POLICIES, supra note 30,
at 52.
68. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
69. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
70. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
71. Id. at 431.
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nation Act, and Section 3304(a)(12) of FUTA, Congress has made
it clear that neither gender nor pregnancy can be the basis of dis-
crimination. Although it did not discriminate on its face, the Mis-
souri statute barring pregnant women who "voluntarily" left their
jobs from receiving unemployment compensation if their jobs were
not preserved, violated section 3304 in result. This is the only viola-
tion necessary under Congress' statutory scheme. The issue in Wim-
berly and in other states where statutes do not make positive provi-
sions for pregnancy, is not that the state laws are intentionally
discriminatory, but that they are discriminatory in effect. Thus, the
"application of the state statute . . . is being challenged. ' 72
There is truly nothing "voluntary" about a woman's decision to
leave her job because of pregnancy. As the dissenting opinion in the
state supreme court's decision in Wimberly acknowledged, "A wo-
man who becomes pregnant has to be absent from work for a time.
She has no choice."'7 3 A neutral state statute interpreting pregnancy
leave as voluntary, violates the law of the land as established by
Congress.7'
The [Industrial and Labor Relations] Commission automat-
ically classifies a pregnant woman as having voluntarily quit her
job when she leaves for confinement and delivery. Pregnancy is,
thus, the primary determinant in the denial of benefits. This
conflicts with the purpose of the federal statute, regardless of
whether state statute law specifically discriminates because of
pregnancy.75
The Supreme Court's reasoning in Wimberly fails to address
traditional Title VII analysis of disparate impact. The Court con-
cluded that section 3304(a)(12) of FUTA permits states to deny un-
employment benefits to women whose employers did not provide
pregnancy disability leaves, even though those women had earned
the specified amount of wages, or worked the specified number of
weeks of covered employment during a one-year base period, and
were able and available for work. 6 If this is the intended meaning of
section 3304(a)(12), then it should be amended. The Wimberly case
makes clear that the Supreme Court will permit tremendous vari-
ance among state unemployment compensation laws pursuant to
72. Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm'n, 688 S.W.2d 344, 352 (Mo. 1985)
(en banc) (Blackmar, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
73. Id.
74. See Denial, supra note 62, at 1945.
75. Wimberly, 688 S.W.2d at 352.
76. Wimberly v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm'n, 107 S. Ct. 821, 824-25 (1987).
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FUTA's guidelines. The Court is correct in asserting that it is un-
necessary to know whether the woman in Wimberly was pregnant."
One merely needs to know that only women get pregnant and that
Congress has outlawed denial of unemployment compensation based
on pregnancy.7"
III. State Maternity Leave Laws
Terminology is the first problem to address in analyzing state
statutes pertaining to leaves for pregnant workers and working par-
ents. Many states use maternity leave to mean pregnancy disability
leave. Others use maternity leave to mean child care leave for
mothers, and still others leave the term undefined, allowing it to be
used to mean either disability leave or parenting leave. This diversity
most probably stems from both a pre-Guerra7 9 lack of clarity about
what was permissible and/or desirable to legislate in the area of
child rearing and a failure to understand the necessity to distinguish
between medical disability leaves and child rearing leaves.
As a result, commentaries on state statutes often contradict
each other about the number of pregnancy disability statutes or pa-
rental leave statutes on record or, in describing statutes as mandat-
ing maternity leave, obscure the content of these statutes."0 For ex-
ample, a Tennessee statute describes "maternity leave" as an unpaid
leave of up to four months for pregnancy disability,8' while a Massa-
chusetts statute allows an unpaid "maternity leave" of up to eight
weeks after adoption of a child under three." The first statute de-
scribes a legally tenable pregnancy disability leave, while the second
describes a legally untenable leave for child care allowed only to
mothers. Both statutes define the same term, "maternity leave," in
completely different and contradictory ways.
Clearly, in the post-Guerra era, no such confusion should be
possible. Under Guerra, a pregnancy disability leave law such as the
Tennessee law just described, which grants leave because of an ac-
tual, temporary physical inability to perform one's job during preg-
nancy and/or immediately following child bearing, is unequivocally
77. Id. at 825.
78. Congress has concluded that "[p]lans that label a woman's separation from work
because of pregnancy as a voluntary termination of employment without good cause in essence
act indirectly to deny benefits on the basis of pregnancy, when a state clearly could not do so
directly." Denial, supra note 62, at 1945.
79. 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
80. Compare any of the commentaries cited in this paper.
81. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-408 (1988).
82. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 105D (West 1982).
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upheld.83 On the other hand, any law granting maternity leave for
child rearing to women only, such as the provision of the Massachu-
setts statute, will be subject to challenge under Title VII and the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment as discrimina-
tory against fathers. In comparing the state statutes, therefore, the
clearest analysis comes from grouping these laws in two distinct cat-
egories: (1) laws allowing leave for disability and (2) laws allowing
leave for child rearing. Even after such a division, the statutes within
each category still will vary widely in terms of actually ensuring
equal employment opportunity. Because of these variances, many
groups support enactment of a federal law like the Family and Med-
ical Leave Act recently introduced in the U.S. Congress, only to die
in committee. 8"
The following discussion explores the legal issues raised by these
two categories of leave laws, the extent to which such laws are in
effect or pending, and the various characteristics of each type. The
conclusion recommends a federal law that will insure uniformity of
employment opportunity from state to state for pregnant women and
parents.
A. Guidance from the United States Supreme Court: the Guerra
Case
In Guerra, the Court made clear that any state that passes a
pregnancy disability leave law, similar to the California statute in
question, will be on firm legal ground.85 Section 12945(b)(2) 6 of the
California Government Code and its concomitant regulations man-
date that employers with fifteen or more employees must provide
reasonable leave for a worker disabled by pregnancy and/or child-
birth. This leave can last up to four months and is accompanied by a
qualified right to reinstatement. An employee must be given back
83. See generally California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987);
see also Casenote, supra note 27, at 787.
84. See Casenote, supra note 27, at 809.
85. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 683-84.
86. Section 12945(b)(2) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice unless based upon a bona fide
occupational qualification: . . . (b) for any employer to refuse to allow a female
employee affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions either:
. . . (2) [tjo take a leave on account of pregnancy for a reasonable period of
time; provided such period shall not exceed four months. Such employee shall be
entitled to utilize any accrued vacation leave during this period of time. Reason-
able period of time means that period during which the female employee is dis-
abled on account of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980).
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her previous job unless her job is no longer available due to business
necessity, a strict standard, which precludes the use of cost as a cri-
teria for denying to the returning mother her old job. If the business
necessity rule precludes an employee's return to her pre-leave posi-
tion, then the employer is required to make a good faith effort to
place her in a substantially similar job, one with equal pay and
status.
The operative elements in this law are medical disability and
job reinstatement rights. Any state statute that confines itself within
these parameters in terms of what it guarantees a pregnant worker
will comply with Title VII and the PDA. Furthermore, this remains
true even if the employer in question does not have a comparable
leave policy for other nonpregnant employees who are similarly dis-
abled. In other words, if an employer complies with a statute like the
California statute by granting a pregnant employee with toxemia a
leave with reinstatement rights but refuses the same type of leave to
a male employee temporarily disabled by a heart attack, the em-
ployer will be in violation neither of Title VII's prohibition against
sex discrimination8" nor of the PDA's mandate that pregnant em-
ployees be treated the same as other similarly disabled employees. 88
This holds true for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court ruled
that the relevant categories to be compared when determining sex
discrimination are not pregnant workers and non-pregnant workers
with similar disabilities but rather working mothers and working fa-
thers. Thus, the Court interpreted the intent of Title VII and the
PDA as allowing women as well as men to have families without risk
of losing their jobs. The basis for the Supreme Court's ruling con-
cerning comparable categories is its interpretation of congressional
intent in passing the PDA. Senator Williams, one of the PDA's
sponsors, made clear that "[t]he entire thrust . . . behind this legis-
lation is to guarantee women the basic right to participate fully and
equally in the workforce, without denying them the fundamental
right to full participation in family life." 89 The clear inference here
is that working fathers already enjoy co-existing rights to full partic-
ipation in work life and family life. Consequently, working fathers
are the appropriate group with which to compare working mothers in
determining whether equality of opportunity exists for pregnant
women in the workplace.
87. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 691 (1987).
88. Id.
89. 123 CONG. REc. 29,658 (1977); Guerra, 107 S. Ct. at 693-94.
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Second, in a concurring opinion in Guerra, Justice Stevens
pointed out that in the previous case of United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber,90 the Supreme Court rejected the idea that Title
VII prohibits all preferential treatment to the disadvantaged classes
it was designed to protect.91 Justice Stevens then noted that it is a
clear and logical inference that the PDA, as well as the rest of Title
VII, permits preferential treatment of pregnant workers as long as
the goal of such treatment is equality of employment opportunity.9"
In so defining the intent of these federal laws, the Supreme
Court has given approval to a sex differences approach to writing
state statutes to ensure equality for women in the workplace. The
Court has said that, as long as state laws do not permit differences
other than biological differences, e.g., child bearing capacity, to be
treated differently under the law and as long as the goal of the law is
equal employment opportunity, that law will be free from threats of
reverse sex discrimination suits. Thus, in post-Guerra America, the
sexes need not be treated equally in terms of disability, because
women are more regularly disadvantaged by pregnancy disability
without job protection than are men by any sex specific disability.
Thus, if women are not given more generous policies for pregnancy
related disability, they will not have employment opportunities in the
workplace that are equal to the opportunities of their male col-
leagues.93 A logical corollary of this is that a woman with a non-
pregnancy disability must be treated the same as a similarly situated
male.
What will be the reaction of the hypothetical male employee
who is refused a leave of the type granted to his pregnant co-worker?
The Court alluded to this issue when it determined that employers
are not precluded from according the male employee equal treat-
ment.94 In other words, if a male employee complains about the ap-
parent inequality present in an employer's leave policy, then the
remedy cannot be to take away the pregnant woman's leave and job
protection. However, nothing in Title VII, the PDA, or Guerra pre-
cludes the employer from giving to the male employee (and all simi-
larly disabled employees) the same leave with job-protected rights.
Indeed, this is the remedy proposed by proponents of the equal treat-
90. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).




93 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW WINTER 1989
ment model rather than the sex differences model.95
As a result of this interpretation of the Guerra precedent, state
legislatures might be pressured by employers, concerned about the
potential costs of a comprehensive disability leave policy, to refrain
from passing any law mandating special treatment of pregnant work-
ers. After all, the Supreme Court found that the PDA, while not
prohibiting special treatment of pregnant workers, did not mandate
such treatment either. Whether the possible impact on employers
will discourage individual states from passing liberal pregnancy leave
laws is problematic. In 1987, however, proposed state legislation for
pregnancy disability leave failed in two states, Missouri and Vir-
ginia. If a decreased willingness to enact pregnancy disability laws is
indeed a result of the Guerra decision, then clearly an argument
should be made for the increased necessity of federal legislation in
this area to guarantee women the equal employment opportunity en-
visioned by Title VII and the PDA.
B. Survey of State Laws
Presently, thirteen states have enacted pregnancy disability poli-
cies that fit the model upheld in Guerra.96 These states include Cali-
fornia, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Mas-
sachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, Oregon, Tennessee and
Washington. Three of these policies are state laws and seven are part
of various antidiscrimination code guidelines and regulations." In
three states, pregnancy disability leave is mandated both by state
95. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
96. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980) and CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 2 §
7291.2(d)(30); COLORADO, SEX DISCRIMINATION RULES, Rule 80.8, reprinted in 8A FAIR
EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 453:1125, 453:1127 (effective May 31, 1972); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(7) (West 1986); HAWAII ADMINISTRATIVE RULES ON SEX DISCRIMI-
NATION § 12-23-58, reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 453:2328 (effective
Nov. 15, 1982); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56 § 5210.110, reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC.
MANUAL (BNA) 453:2761, 453:2764 (effective Nov. 14, 1985); IOWA CODE § 601A.6(2)
(1987), 1987 IOWA LEGIS. SERV. 139 (West); KANSAS COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS RULES
AND REGULATIONS § 21-32-6, reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 453:3301
(effective Jan. 1, 1974); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105D (West 1982) and MASS.
REGS. CODE tit. 804,§ 3.02(7)(a)-(h), § 8.01; MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-2-310 - 49-2-311
(1987) MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.9.1201-1207; NEW HAMPSHIRE COMMISSION FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS, HUM 402.03 (1987), reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 455:2451,
455:2464 (as amended Feb. 10, 1987); OR. ADMIN. R. 839-07-500-530 (1986); TENN CODE
ANN. 4-21-408 (1988), reprinted in FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 457:1821 (effective
Jan. 1, 1988); WASHINGTON, HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SEX DISCRIMINATION REGULA-
TIONS WAC 162-30-020 reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 457:2951 (effec-
tive Oct. 28, 1973).
97. Connecticut, Iowa and Tennessee have all enacted pregnancy disability leave legisla-
tion. Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, Oregon and Washington require
pregnancy disability leave by regulation under state antidiscrimination statutes.
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law and by civil rights guidelines.98 Two of the three states with dis-
ability statutes, Iowa and Tennessee, passed these laws in 1987. 99
All of these policies seem to meet the criteria established in
Guerra with the exception of one provision in the Massachusetts law.
That provision combines pregnancy disability leave with child rear-
ing leave by guaranteeing reinstatement rights to a female employee
who is absent from work for up to eight weeks "for the purpose of
giving birth" or "for adopting a child under three years of age."1 '
Since adoption is not a biological function peculiar to women, as is
childbirth, this provision clearly fails to maintain the necessary dis-
tinction between actual physical disability and child rearing. In addi-
tion, by limiting the child rearing leave provision to female employ-
ees, the Massachusetts law fails to meet the justifiable sex
differences test established in Guerra.0' It could, therefore, be
viewed under Title VII as discrimination against adoptive fathers.
Furthermore, this provision appears to run counter to the legis-
lative intent established for the PDA in Guerra. That intent was to
avoid any leave laws that perpetuated outmoded and undesirable cul-
tural stereotypes about parenting, such as the stereotype that the
mother is the one who should take the leave."0 2 If Massachusetts
wishes to provide leave for adoption, it appears that it would have to
do so in the form of a gender neutral parental-leave statute. In fact,
such a law is pending in Massachusetts. A similar bill is pending in
the Pennsylvania legislature"0 3 and is subject to the same criticism.
While the laws of these thirteen states fundamentally resemble
each other, there is enough range among them to change the amount
of equal employment opportunity guaranteed from state to state.
This range is generally apparent in the qualifying stipulations in-
cluded in these laws. All require that a woman be reinstated to her
previous or similar job if her leave does not exceed the stipulated
length unless "business necessity" or "changed circumstances" make
this impossible. Tennessee is an exception in that it stipulates that, if
a woman's job is so specialized that she cannot be replaced by a
temporary employee, she need not be given her old job back."°4 This
98. These states are California, Massachusetts and Montana, see supra note 96 for stat-
utory and regulatory citations.
99. See supra note 96.
100. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105D (West 1982).
101. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683, 694 (1987).
102. MATERNITY POLICIES, supra note 30, at 144.
103. S. 350. This bill was pending in the Labor and Industry Committee as of June,
1987. See BNA, supra note 29, at 96-106.
104. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-408, reprinted in FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA)
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appears to be a specific form of business necessity.
The Massachusetts statute, which requires reinstatement to the
same or a similar position, names another form of changed circum-
stances. That statute stipulates that a woman returning from a preg-
nancy disability leave need not be given her old job back if employ-
ees with similar status and length of service have been laid off due to
"economic conditions" or other changes in operating conditions dur-
ing her disability leave.10 5 Most existing laws allow the business ne-
cessity defense only for private employers, while state employees
have a virtually unqualified guarantee to reinstatement.
All of the laws, except Iowa's, set a minimum number of em-
ployees necessary before the statute is applicable. This number
ranges from one to one hundred with nine of the statutes mandating
employers with one to eight employees. Clearly, fewer women will be
protected in Tennessee, which exempts employers with fewer than
one hundred people from complying with the law. The minimum em-
ployee standard has greater impact than perhaps initially was under-
stood since women tend to be disproportionately employed in smaller
businesses. 106
Another variable that limits the applicability of these laws is the
full-time, part-time issue. Although not all the laws state specifically
that only full-time employees are covered, many do, and none specify
that part-time employees are covered. This seems to allow a legal
way to deny many women pregnancy disability leave, as women are
disproportionately employed in part-time positions. 07 Perhaps this is
true partially because of the lack of congruence between the current
structure of the workplace and the demands of family responsibility.
In addition, another important issue to consider in assessing the
level of protection afforded women by individual states is the allowed
length of leave. Eight of the existing provisions stipulate that an em-
ployer must allow a reasonable leave for pregnancy disability.10 * This
has generally been interpreted to mean the traditional six to eight
week postpartum period with flexibility allowed for individual cases.
The Washington regulation covers the "period of actual disability,"
thus appearing to allow total flexibility for individual cases."0 9 The
457:1821 (effective Jan. 1, 1988).
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105D (West 1982).
106. Dowd, supra note 17, at 711.
107. Id. at 711-12.
108. These provisions are found in the following state statutes: California, Colorado,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Kansas, Montana and Oregon. For the statutory citation see
supra note 96.
109. WASHINGTON HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION SEX DISCRIMINATION REGULATIONS
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statutes of California and Tennessee stipulate up to four months as
the maximum leave permissible and New Hampshire's statute allows
up to six months.110 Iowa and Massachusetts stipulate eight weeks,
which in most cases corresponds to "reasonable time" but is too rigid
to accommodate the individual with serious pregnancy/delivery com-
plications."' In addition, the Massachusetts statute grants leave for
the purposes of giving birth and seems to exclude disability leave for
pregnancy complications experienced prior to birth. Thus, pregnant
residents of Iowa and Massachusetts seem to get less complete job
protection than do pregnant residents in several other states.
Existing leave policies vary in terms of the waiting period re-
quired before employers must grant pregnancy disability leave. Ten
states allow the length of the waiting period to be determined by the
employer's discretion."1 2 Massachusetts specifies that in order to be
eligible, an employee must have completed her company's stated pro-
bationary period. The Massachusetts statute, however, goes one step
further by stipulating that if an individual employer has no stated
probationary period, a pregnant employee must be employed full-
time for three months before being eligible for pregnancy disability
leave. 113 Illinois specifies twenty calendar weeks and Tennessee spec-
ifies one year as the waiting period before the pregnancy disability
leave guarantee applies." 4
No state mandates that the leave be paid, but the Iowa statute
stipulates that "disability leave needed because of pregnancy should
be treated the same as any other disability leave. Written and un-
written policies on duration, seniority, benefits and pay would be the
same for a pregnancy disability leave as for any other disability."""
Iowa's statute thus echoes the intent of the PDA to insure that if a
WAC 162-30-020 reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 457:2951 (effective
Oct. 28, 1973). The regulation states that, "An employer shall provide a woman a leave of
absence for the period of time that she is sick or temporarily disabled because of pregnancy of
child birth."
110. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12945(b)(2) (West 1980) and TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-408,
reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 457:1821 (effective Jan. 1, 1988) provide
for up to four months leave. New Hampshire Commission for Human Rights, HUM 402.03
(1987), reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 455:2451, 455:2464 (as amended
Feb. 19, 1987) allows a maximum of six months leave.
Ill. IOWA CODE § 601A.6(2) (1987), 1987 IOWA LEGIS. SERV. 139 (West); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 105D (West 1982).
112. These states are California, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Mon-
tana, New Hampshire, Oregon and Washington. See supra note 96.
113. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105D (West 1982).
114. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 56, § 5210.110, reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL PRAC. MANUAL
(BNA) 453:2761, 453:2764 (effective Nov. 14, 1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-408 (1988),
reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 457:1249 (effective Jan. 1, 1988).
115. IOWA CODE § 601A.6(2) (1987); 1987 IOWA LEGIS. SERV. 139 (West).
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company has a paid disability leave for other temporary disabilities,
it must also have one for pregnancy disability. In truth, all compa-
nies with fifteen or more employees in all states would appear to
have to conform to this policy under the recent Supreme Court inter-
pretation of the PDA." 6 Iowa also approves of a limited sex differ-
ences approach in a second provision of its statute, which states that,
if an employer does not have sufficient disability leave policy for
other disabilities, then that employer must nevertheless grant a dis-
abled pregnant worker a leave of absence of up to eight weeks." 7
Here, Iowa legislators appear cognizant of the equal employment op-
portunity standard set out in Title VII and reiterated in Guerra.
As implied in the Iowa statute, legal requirements relative to a
returning mother's status in the area of benefits and seniority will
vary greatly. Some statutes specifically insure that upon reinstate-
ment, an employee will regain her pre-leave level of benefits and se-
niority. Other statutes, like Iowa's, tie the returning mother's senior-
ity and benefits to policies already in place for other disability leaves
in each individual company. Still other statutes fail to make clear
whether pre-leave benefits and seniority are protected at all.
In summary, thirteen states have disability leave policies in
place that, with one exception, appear legally tenable.118 Three more
states and the District of Columbia have legally tenable bills pend-
ing,119 while Pennsylvania's pending bill will probably not pass legal
tests. In two states, Missouri and Virginia, the state legislatures re-
cently defeated legally tenable pregnancy disability laws.' 20 At best,
pregnant women in sixteen states will soon be provided with equal
employment opportunity through varying degrees of job protection.
Whether the recent Supreme Court decision in Guerra mobilizes
more states to mandate job protection for pregnant workers or dis-
courages such laws remains to be seen. In the absence of a signifi-
cant increase in such laws, there certainly will be increased lobbying
by groups such as the Women's Legal Defense Fund for a federal
law resembling the failed Family and Medical Leave Act' in order
to fill this void on the state level.
116. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987). See infra
note 146.
117. IOWA CODE § 601A.6(2)(e) (1987).
118. See supra note 96.
119. The three state bills are New York Bill A 5522, Vermont Bill H 322, and Wiscon-
sin Senate Bill 235. The District of Columbia bill is 7-57. See BNA, supra note 29, at 96-106.
120. Missouri Bill H 615 was withdrawn from consideration in 1987. Virginia Bill H
1416 failed in committee in 1987. See BNA, supra note 29, at 96-106.
121. H.R. 925, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
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C. Parental Leave
The intent of pregnancy disability leave laws is to protect
women from the potentially damaging effects on their careers of
pregnancy-related physical problems. The intent of parental child
care leave laws, however, is to allow mothers and fathers the bonding
time that many child care experts view as essential to a healthy par-
ent/child relationship. Leading child study expert T. Berry Brazel-
ton has estimated that three months is the minimum time necessary
for such bonding. 22 Enacted with an intent different from that of
pregnancy disability leave laws, parental child care leave laws are
less directly governed by Title VII and the PDA. Thus, laws grant-
ing parental leaves for child rearing operate without the clear court
rulings that exist in the area of pregnancy disability laws.
What seems certain from our preceding discussion of Guerra,
however, is that leaves for child rearing differ from pregnancy disa-
bility leaves in one fundamental way - there is no biological basis
for treating the sexes differently when granting leave for child rear-
ing. In fact, any law that stipulates that only mothers can take fam-
ily leave for child rearing purposes serves to perpetuate the cultural
myth that mothers are by nature the ones who should be the primary
caretakers of young children. Indeed, reinforcing such a cultural be-
lief constitutes an obstacle to a mother having an employment oppor-
tunity equal to that of a father and would run counter to the goals of
Title VII and the PDA as reaffirmed in Guerra.1 3 Furthermore,
feminist groups, as well as groups advocating for fathers' rights,
would most certainly attack any such law on this basis. Clearly, the
sex differences approach is not justified in this instance.
It is conceivable that other employees, desiring temporary un-
paid leaves for personal purposes, such as extended travel or continu-
ing education, would claim that parental child care leave statutes
give special preference to parents and so discriminate against non-
parents with personal needs to fulfill. No such claim could be
brought under Title VII, but whether such an individual may have
other legal recourse remains to be seen.
The four states that have enacted parental leave for child rear-
ing statutes (Connecticut, Minnesota, Oregon and Rhode Island) ap-
pear to recognize the legal issues involved." 4 None of these statutes
122. See T. BERRY BRAZELTON, TODDLERS AND PARENTS 29 (1974).
123. MATERNITY POLICIES, supra note 31, at 149.
124. 1987 CONN. PUB. ACTS. 87-291; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 181.940-.943; OR. REV.
STAT. § 659.360 (1987), reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 457:617 (effec-
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stipulates that only the mother can take such a leave. There is some
confusion, however, about how to be nondiscriminatory in granting
such leaves. For example, Connecticut's law allows state workers to
take a maximum of twenty-four weeks of unpaid family leave. This
statute does not state specifically whether both mother and father
may take this leave for the same child. Nor does it indicate whether
both leaves (if they are permissible) could run consecutively. Consec-
utive leaves would allow parents to minimize economic impact and
delay the necessity for daycare. 16 Minnesota's law also allows "new
parents" the option of taking six weeks of unpaid leave within six
weeks of a child's birth or adoption. The wording in that statute
seems to imply that one parent could take leave for the first six
weeks after a child's birth/adoption, while the other parent could
take off the second six weeks.12 Both Connecticut and Minnesota,
by not stating that only one parent may take leave for any one child,
leave the way clear for both parents to do so.
Oregon, however, states explicitly what Connecticut and Minne-
sota leave to inference.127 The Oregon statute provides that both
mothers and fathers may take child care leave for the same child. It
stipulates that employers must be given notice of the dates each par-
ent intends to take leave, that their combined leave not exceed
twelve weeks, and that the leaves not be taken concurrently. Rhode
Island's statute also clearly grants both parents the right to child
care leave for the same child. This statute provides thirteen weeks of
unpaid child care leave for "every employee" who has met the wait-
ing period requirements.
1 28
tive Jan. 1, 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-48-1-28-48-9 reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC.
MANUAL (BNA) 457:1249 (effective June 1, 1987).
125. The Connecticut statute states as follows: "Each permanent employee, as defined in
subsection (0) of section 5-196 of the general statutes shall be entitled to the following: (1) a
maximum of twenty-four weeks of family leave of absence within any two-year period upon
the birth or adoption of a child such employee ...." 1987 CONN. PUB. ACrS. 87-291 § 1(a).
126. The statute states, "The leave shall begin at a time requested by the employee. The
employer may adopt reasonable policies governing the timing of requests for unpaid leave. The
leave may begin not more than six weeks after the birth or adoption." MINN. STAT. ANN. §
181.941(2) (West Supp. 1988).
127. The Oregon statute states:
The employer is not required to grant to an employee parental leave which
would allow the employee and the other parent of the child, if also employed,
parental leave totaling more than the amount specified in paragraphs (a) and (b)
of subsection (1) of this section nor to grant to an employee parental leave for
any period of time in which the child's other parent is also taking parental leave
from employment.
OR. REV. STAT. § 659.360(2) (1987), reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA)
457:617 (effective Jan. 1, 1988).
128. The Rhode Island statute provides: "Every employee who has been employed by
the same employer for twelve (12) consecutive months shall be entitled, upon advance notice to
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By applying the legal findings set forth in Guerra,'29 it seems
that both parents should be allowed child care leave for the same
child if each is to enjoy equal opportunity to parent that child with-
out losing his or her job. All four of these statutes30 seem to agree
with this reasoning. With the exception of Oregon, each statute,
however, stops short of stating clearly that parents need not choose
who will take the child care leave. Realistically, if parental leaves
remain largely unpaid, this may be a moot question since there will
be few cases where both parents can afford to stop working, even if
the leaves are taken consecutively rather than concurrently.
Furthermore, these four statutes vary with regard to the length
of leave allowed. The range is from six weeks in Minnesota to a
maximum of twenty-four weeks in Connecticut. This reflects a diver-
gence of opinion about what constitutes the necessary bonding time
in the parent/child relationship.1"1 The minimum number of employ-
ees a company must have before it needs to comply with the family
leave statute also varies. That range is from twenty-one to fifty em-
ployees with the Connecticut statute covering only state employ-
ees. 1832 Connecticut's statute does not stipulate a waiting period,
while Minnesota's and Rhode Island's stipulate a one year waiting
period before the employer is required to grant the parent a child
care leave. Oregon's statute has a ninety-day waiting period, which
is considerably shorter than that of Minnesota or Rhode Island.
With regard to full-time/part-time coverage, the statutes in
Connecticut and Oregon are silent on whether part-time employees
are covered.133 Theoretically, the way is clear for such employees to
press their claim to the statutorily enacted child care leave. Minne-
sota's statute stipulates that a parent must work at least twenty
hours per week in order to be eligible for child care leave.'3 Rhode
Island's statute, meanwhile, specifically covers only employees who
work a minimum of thirty hours per week. 3 '
his or her employer, to thirteen (13) consecutive work weeks of parental leave in any two (2)
calendar years. ... R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-2(a) (1988), reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL.
PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 457.1249 (effective June 1, 1987).
129. California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 107 S. Ct. 683 (1987).
130. See supra note 124.
131. Id.
132. See BNA, supra note 29, at 98 (1987). The Governor of Connecticut has, however,
created a task force to consider the issue of parental leave in the private sector. The task
force's report was due out in June, 1988.
133. 1987 Conn. Pub. Acts. 87-291; OR. REv. STAT. § 659.360 (1987), reprinted in 8A
FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL (BNA) 457:617 (effective Jan. 1, 1988).
134. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.940(2) (West Supp. 1988).
135. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-1(b) (1988), reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL
(BNA) 457:1249 (effective July 1, 1987).
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All four states appear to protect reinstatement rights except in
the case of "changed circumstances." While none mandates paid
leave, these statutes do attempt to protect an employee's accrued
benefits. For example, Connecticut mandates that parents on child
care leave will retain seniority, retirement, and other fringe benefits,
except that leave time is not counted toward pension benefits."3 6
Minnesota provides that workers returning from a child care leave
must receive any automatic pay adjustments given during the leave
period.""7 Although Rhode Island stipulates that an employee on
child care leave must pay health care premiums, the statute man-
dates that an employee be reimbursed for the cost of those premiums
when he or she returns to work.'3" The Oregon statute does state
that an employer may require use of accrued vacation, sick, or com-
pensatory time to cover the child care leave, 39 something parents
probably would do happily, as it might prolong that portion of the
leave time for which they are receiving compensation. Presumably,
other state statutes also would allow such use of accrued time if the
employee so requests. All of the statutes recognize the fact that
fringe benefits (or the lack thereof) are an issue that must be consid-
ered when legislating child care leave. Clearly, each of these statutes
focuses on different benefits and all their provisions may not be
equally favorable to an individual worker requiring child care leave.
In addition to the four child care leave statutes in effect, five
more states have such statutes pending. 10 Essentially the same is-
sues arise with regard to the pending statutes as with those already
enacted. There are, however, a few exceptions. The pending Massa-
chusetts law is notable in that it classifies available child care leave
into full-time and part-time leave, thus allowing the parent to take
up to eighteen weeks of leave from all work or up to thirty-six weeks
of leave during which the employee works at least fifty percent of his
or her pre-leave hours. This is an important provision because it al-
lows parents the option of part-time work for a longer leave period.
It has other advantages including financial benefits, permitting the
parent a significant time for bonding and allowing a gradual phase-
136. 1987 Conn. Pub. Acts 87-291(1)(a).
137. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.942(2) (West Supp. 1988).
138. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-48-3(b) (1988), reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL
(BNA) 457:1249 (effective July 1, 1987).
139. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.360(3) (1987), reprinted in 8A FAIR EMPL. PRAC. MANUAL
(BNA) 457:617 (effective Jan. 1, 1988).
140. These states bills are Alaska Bill S 124, California Bill AB 368, Illinois Bill H 86,
Massachusetts Bill HB 5200, HB 4502 and New York Bill A 5522. See BNA, supra note 29,
at 96-106.
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in period for full-time babysitters. The Massachusetts proposal also
would institute a wage replacement fund that would provide sixty
percent of the pre-leave income for up to twelve weeks to parents on
child care leave. The Massachusetts law, therefore, seems to guaran-
tee important benefits that are not presently in place there or in any
other state.
The laws pending in Illinois14 and New York, 4" however, may
not be worded clearly enough to pass legal tests of discrimination.
The Illinois statute allows eighteen weeks of unpaid family leave and
twenty-six weeks of unpaid medical leave for pregnant workers. The
law pending in New York would allow parental leave beginning in
the seventh month of pregnancy and ending one year after child-
birth. It could be inferred that both of these statutes allow child care
leave only to mothers because statements about the nature of the
child care leave include the word "pregnancy." If this is indeed the
intent of these statutes, they are clearly vulnerable to attack on
equal protection and reverse discrimination grounds. If this is not
their intent, the wording of these statutes should be clarified.
In 1987, six states defeated proposed child care leave laws: Ari-
zona, Colorado, Florida, Maryland, New Jersey and Washington. 143
In Florida, two such proposed laws failed in the 1987 legislature. In
Arizona and Florida, the proposed laws appeared to limit child care
leave to mothers only and so probably many would not have passed
legal tests. In Colorado, "intense lobbying against it by business in-
terests" 44 killed a bill essentially similar to the four proposed laws
previously discussed. This may suggest a looming difficulty for pa-
rental leave laws: whether private employers will be willing to sus-
tain the disruption and costs to their businesses that may result from
more universal policies granting child care leaves.
In summary, parents in ten states may have rights to child care
leaves soon. Statutes promising such leaves clearly represent the sec-
ond wave of parenting legislation. This type of leave is not the high-
est priority for legislators because the intent of Title VII and the
PDA seems much more obviously to include pregnancy disability
leaves than to include parental child care leaves. This is true because
141. See supra note 140.
142. Id.
143. See Arizona Bill S 1436; Colorado Bill HB 1292; Florida HB 329; Maryland Bill
HB 1401; New Jersey Bill SB 239 and Washington Bill HB 565. BNA, supra note 29, at 96-
106.
144. See BNA, supra note 29, at 96-106.
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the intent of these statutes is to guarantee equal employment oppor-
tunity to present workers, not to guarantee these workers the right to
bond with their children or to insure future generations of workers
who have successfully bonded to their parents. Another explanation
for the fact that child care leave statutes lag behind pregnancy disa-
bility statutes is that granting both parents extended child care leave
represents a greater disruption to "business as usual" in the work
place, a disruption, as seen before, which American business inter-
ests may not be willing to support. Nevertheless, it does appear that,
as a nation, we have a clear and abiding stake in the well being of
each new generation of Americans, and that this stake is best pro-
tected by a carefully developed uniform national policy mandating
the granting of child care leaves to both parents upon request.
This survey of the current status of state laws addressing preg-
nancy disability leave and parental child care leave shows that, if
there is to be a consistent restructuring of the workplace across the
country to allow both mothers and fathers to have children and to
bond with them without losing their jobs, then legislation on the na-
tional level is absolutely necessary. If such legislation could with-
stand and satisfy the inevitable demands of lobbyists for American
business interests, it would guarantee that parents from state to state
would have the same rights to job-protected pregnancy disability and
child care leaves, rather than being subjected to the disparate priori-
ties and vagaries of the various state laws. Only then would the
equal employment opportunity goal of Title VII and the PDA be
truly met.
IV. Conclusion
Neither the PDA nor FUTA have put working women and their
families in a secure position in the event that pregnancy and child-
birth interferes even briefly with their ability to work. A federal stat-
ute mandating job preservation for the period of pregnancy-related
disability is critical to women's retention of any meaningful place in
the employment sphere. In states that do not require employers to
provide job preservation, equal treatment as "others disabled" ac-
cording to the PDA does not even give women the right to take ac-
crued vacation and sick leave as a maternity leave when a company's
policy prohibits leave until the completion of a probationary pe-
riod,14" 5 or prohibits leave during certain peak periods.
145. See Dowd, supra note 17, at 711.
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The equal treatment approach allows facially neutral policies
for the disabled to wreak havoc on the ability of women to maintain
their jobs through the process of childbirth. 1 6 Since some state un-
employment compensation statutes (which will probably withstand
the "neutral on its face" test enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Wimberly) have a disparate impact on pregnant women, federal as-
surance of the earned benefit of partial wage replacement during the
period of physical disability associated with childbirth would provide
economic support to families at a critical time. Child rearing leaves
extending beyond the actual period of a mother's disability should be
available to mothers and fathers on a fair and equal basis to assure
that men are not deprived of a right to which women are entitled,
and to insure that women are not legally and culturally consigned to
traditional roles as nurturers. 47
146. See generally Dowd, supra note 17, at 710-11. "[A] substantial number of working
women are entitled to no leave or only to inadequate leave." Id. at 710. Dowd notes also that
leave policies are far more common in large companies than in small companies, a finding that
is not surprising in light of Title VII's applicability to employers having fifteen employees or
more. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(B) (1982). Absent state statutes that entitle women in smaller
companies to pregnancy disability leave, smaller employers are not legally required to preserve
jobs, and a small employer that implements a generous leave policy puts itself at a competitive
disadvantage. See MATERNITY POLICY, supra note 31, at 148. Furthermore, the problem is
exacerbated by the fact that small firms employ a disproportionately large number of women.
See BNA, supra note 29, at 119. See generally Note, Equality in the Workplace: Is That
Enough for Pregnant Workers?, 23 J. FAM. L. 401, 417-18 (1984-85) (It is unwise as a matter
of social policy to treat pregnancy as any other disability because "[slociety expects and de-
mands, and it's a necessity that women become pregnant. Society both needs the woman
worker and needs the mother." (footnote omitted). Id. at 417.
147. Employers would not view women as so at risk for career disruption if men were
clearly entitled to paternity leave under federal law. See, e.g., MATERNITY POLICIES, supra
note 30, at 149; Taub, From Parental Leaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 381, 381 (1984-85) (parental leaves should be available to men and women); Dowd,
supra note 17, at 714 (employment policies which deny parenting leave to men perpetuate
invalid stereotypes of appropriate social roles that particularly disadvantage women).

